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NOTES
GOVERNMENT-CONTRACTOR IMMUNITY—I’M JUST FOL
LOWING ORDERS: A FAIR STANDARD OF IMMUNITY FOR MILITARY
SERVICE CONTRACTORS
INTRODUCTION
For all that could be said of it, the war in Iraq has highlighted a
number of substantial changes in the makeup and structure of the
United States military in a theater of war. Prominent among these
changes is a dramatic increase in the use of private military contrac
tors within the war zone itself.1 This substantial expansion of the
use of service contractors within the war zone includes everything
from maintenance, construction, and administration workers to
armed, private, commercial soldiers or security forces.2 Contractors
are steadily replacing enlisted, uniformed soldiers in many aspects
of the military’s various missions.3
Every morning in Iraq and Afghanistan, a shadow army heads
to work in numbers equal to or greater than that of the United
States Armed Forces.4 These men and women make up the em
ployee base of companies contracted by the military to perform any
of a great variety of duties.5 Many of these contractors fill jobs that
would have been held by soldiers fifty years ago.6 Today, these ci
vilian contractors fly the planes, clean the barracks, repair the heli
1.

See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, CONTRACTORS’ SUPPORT OF U.S. OP
IRAQ 12-13 (2008), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/96xx/doc9688/
08-12-IraqContractors.pdf [hereinafter CONTRACTOR REPORT] (noting that the ratio of
contractor-to-soldier has reached an unprecedented level for a major military
operation).
2. Id. at 11 fig.5.
3. See id. at 12 (describing the change in military policy now favoring the use of
contractors in support roles previously filled by soldiers). In many respects, this reflects
a change in the size and model of the military in a post-Cold War world. Id. It appears
that a specialized, volunteer army is not big enough to perform all the support tasks
necessary for an operation like the war in Iraq. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
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copters, and provide security for important visitors.7 Despite the
decreased use of its own personnel, the military8 still has an active
hand in dictating flight patterns, passenger lists, maintenance sched
ules, security protocols, and the job specifications for hosts of con
tractor jobs.9 This division of labor raises an important legal issue:
a soldier cannot sue the United States for injuries he suffers inci
dent to his service,10 but the soldier can sue a private contractor for
such injuries. For example, during the Vietnam War, a soldier
transported in a military plane flown by military pilots had no cause
of action against the United States if his plane crashed.11 Today,
however, a soldier in Iraq who suffers injury in the crash of a civil
ian military contractor plane has a cause of action against the
airline.12
While a plane crash might be a rare event, it is an unfortunate
fact of war that things often go wrong and many people are hurt.
Even outside of direct combat, any endeavor as large and compli
cated as the civilian contractor operation in Iraq is bound to pro
duce tragedy. In some of these cases, the genesis of the incident is
not in the negligent execution of a task by a civilian contractor.13
Absent negligent action, the legal analysis must go further back and
inquire into the possibility of negligent planning. What if the main
tenance on a helicopter was performed adequately but the fre
quency of the maintenance requested by the military is the origin of
the problem?14 What if the plane was operated competently, yet
the flight plan given to the contractor by the military exposed the
entire flight to considerable risk?15
7. See id.
8. In this Note, “military” will refer to all branches of the United States Armed
Forces as well as the civilian employees within the Department of Defense who assist
those branches in coordinating and contracting for services in the theater of war.
9. See, e.g., McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1336 (11th Cir.
2007) (noting that the military retained control over what flights would be flown, where
to, and with who onboard, among other mission details); Hudgens v. Bell Helicopters/
Textron, 328 F.3d 1329, 1331 (11th Cir. 2003) (noting that the military retained control
over the frequency and thoroughness of maintenance inspections on helicopters).
10. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
11. See id.
12. McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1352-53 (allowing claim brought by the families of
deceased soldiers against military-contractor airline whose plane crashed, resulting in
the soldiers’ deaths).
13. See, e.g., Hudgens, 328 F.3d 1329.
14. This example is based on the facts of Hudgens. Id. at 1332.
15. This example is based on the facts of McMahon. 502 F.3d at 1337.
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The issue addressed in this Note is whether private military
service contractors should be afforded any level of immunity be
cause of their contractual relationship with the United States mili
tary and the United States government. Concluding that
contractors are entitled to some immunity, this Note considers just
how much immunity should be granted, the situations in which such
immunity would apply, and the basis for such immunity in relation
to existing legal concepts and policy considerations.
Ultimately, this Note argues that military service contractors
should be entitled to immunity in much the same way that contrac
tors are afforded immunity in the products liability context. This
Note proposes that a version of the Boyle v. United Technology
Corp. test, logically modified to suit the services industry, would
fairly determine the applicability of this immunity.16 This test
would shield contractors from liability when (1) the injury in ques
tion resulted from an order, plan, or directive from the United
States military, (2) the plan or order was executed without negli
gence by the contractor, and (3) the contractor had disclosed to the
United States any concerns or potential risks.17 This test presents a
workable solution that honors the rationales that have supported
military immunity and military products-liability immunity for more
than fifty years while at the same time fairly leaving liability to the
contractors when their negligent execution of a contractual duty has
caused an injury.
Part I of this Note discusses a changing military environment,
touching on the expansion of the use of military contractors and the
blurring of the lines between the private and government sectors
when it comes to the United States’s military endeavors.18 Part II
examines the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the Federal Tort
Claims Act, which waived much of the government’s sovereign im
munity.19 Part III addresses the landmark case Feres v. United
States, which established protection for the United States Armed
Forces against suit by its soldiers. Part III also discusses the line of
16. Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988); see infra note 139 and
accompanying text.
17. See id.
18. See P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED
MILITARY INDUSTRY 217-26, 228-33 (Robert J. Art et al. eds., 2004).
19. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006); Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549, 561-62 (1988)
(stating that Congress partially waived sovereign immunity in the Federal Tort Claims
Act).

R
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cases that expands and refines the Feres doctrine.20 Part IV of this
Note analyzes two areas of government contracting that have estab
lished immunity standards: civilian government contracting and mil
itary contracting for products procurement. Finally, Part V argues
for a limited immunity standard for military services contractors.
I. A CHANGING MILITARY
The use of military contractors in war is not a modern con
cept.21 Mercenaries were a staple of European armies until the Cri
mean War in 1853.22 The English army that was sent against
American revolutionaries was no exception and included almost
30,000 “Hessian” Germans.23 The United States began using mili
tary contractors in that same war, before the country was even
founded.24
The history of contractors in American wars is not one of
steady escalation but instead has fluctuated and changed over the
years.25 The highest level of contractor use was in World War II,

20. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950). See generally David
Seidelson, From Feres v. United States to Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.: An Ex
amination of Supreme Court Jurisprudence and a Couple of Suggestions, 32 DUQ. L.
REV. 219 (1994); John Astley, Note, United States v. Johnson: Feres Doctrine Gets New
Life and Continues to Grow, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 185 (1988).
21. See SINGER, supra note 18, at 19.
22. See id. at 32-33.
23. Id. at 33. The “Hessians” were a group of German mercenaries hired by the
British during the Revolutionary War. They were given their name by American mili
tiamen based on the majority of the mercenaries being from the Hesse-Kassel region of
Germany. Id.
24. CONTRACTOR REPORT, supra note 1, at 12.
25. See id. at 13 tbl.2.
The following table shows the ratio of contractor personnel to military personnel in
armed conflicts the United States has participated in:

R

R
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with approximately 734,000 contractors on the ground.26 To com
pare, there are approximately 190,000 contractors on the ground in
Iraq.27 The difference in the size of the conflicts, however, cannot
be understated. With few variations, the ratio of contractors to en-

Presence of Contractor Personnel During U.S. Military Operations (in thousands)
Conflict

Contractor Personnel

Revolutionary War

2

War of 1812

Military Personnel
9

Ratio
1 to 6

n.a.

38

n.a.

6

33

1 to 6

Civil War

200

1,000

1 to 5

Spanish-American War

n.a.

35

World War I

85

2,000

1 to 24

World War II

734

5,400

1 to 7

Korean War

156

393

Vietnam War

70

359

1 to 5

500

1 to 55*

20

20

1 to 1

190

200

1 to 1

Mexican-American War

Gulf War

9*

Balkans
Iraq Theater as of Early 2008

n.a.

1 to 2.5

* “The government of Saudi Arabia provided significant amounts of products and services
during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Personnel associated with those pro
visions are not included in the data or the ratio.” Id.
Id. (modified from table 2).
ESTIMATED RATIO

OF

CONTRACTOR

TO

MILITARY PERSONNEL

1.2
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
World
War I

World
War II

Korea

Vietnam

Balkans

Iraq

See id. (Gulf War data excluded due to the omission of the Saudi contribution, which skews
the data).

26.
27.

Id.
Id.
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listed personnel has increased steadily with each conflict in which
the United States has engaged.28
While 5.4 million United States soldiers were deployed in
World War II, only 200,000 have been deployed in Iraq.29 This
leaves the ratio of contractor-to-military in World War II at roughly
one-to-seven.30 In Iraq, however, this number has risen to approxi
mately one to one.31 The use of military and government contrac
tors in the United States’s current operation in Iraq is at record
levels.32 The United States currently has approximately as many
contractors in the Iraq theater as it does uniformed servicemen.33
This record use of contractors extends to security forces and
armed private military forces, which account for expenditures of be
tween $500 million and $1.2 billion annually.34 An estimated $32
billion worth of United States’s contracts in Iraq have required the
use of nonmilitary security.35 The use of such security forces costs
roughly the same per person as the use of a uniformed soldier, al
though the nature of a contracted security force makes it a more
financially flexible option for peacetime.36
The expanded use of contractors—especially armed contrac
tors for security and pseudomilitary activities—frames the context
within which this Note is written. Numerous concerns surround the
nature of these contractors, their legal designations, their roles, and
what their expanded existence means for twenty-first-century war
and the twenty-first-century United States military.37 Specific con
cerns include the lack of contractor regulation and the lack of a
clear definition of a contractor’s legal status.38 The record level of
28. See id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See Mike Mount, Report: U.S. Using Contractors in Iraq at Unprecedented
Rate, CNNPOLITICS.COM, Aug. 12, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/08/12/
iraq.contractors/index.html.
33. CONTRACTOR REPORT, supra note 1, at 13 tbl.2.
34. Id. at 13-14.
35. Id. at 14.
36. Id. The full analysis of this comparison is available in Box 2 of the report.
See id. at 16-17.
37. See SINGER, supra note 18, at 217-26, 228-33; see also P.W. Singer, Warriors
for Hire in Iraq, SALON.COM, Apr. 15, 2004, http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2004/
04/15/warriors/index.html; cf. Ian Traynor, The Privatisation of War, THE GUARDIAN,
Dec. 10, 2003, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/dec/10/politics.iraq (providing a
British perspective on the phenomenon in both the British and American armies).
38. See SINGER, supra note 18, at 228-29. Singer’s primary concern is that in an
unregulated market for contracted military forces, where contractors live and work in a

R

R

R
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outsourcing and intertwining of the military and its contractors dur
ing the Iraq war reveals a military significantly different than the
one for which existing legal principles of military contractor immu
nity was built.
II. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

AND THE

FTCA

The doctrine of sovereign immunity far predates the founding
of the United States. It is based on the notion that the King, as the
“font of the law,” is not bound by the law; and that the King, as the
“font of justice,” cannot be sued in his own courts.39 In practical
and modern terms, sovereign immunity shields the United States
from civil suit and criminal prosecution.40 In the United States, the
federal government was immune from tort actions for more than a
century before Congress passed legislation that waived the immu
nity for certain torts and established jurisdiction in the federal
courts over certain types of claims made against the government.41
This legislation came in the form of the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA), which authorized suit against the government for torts
nebulous legal gray area, they become unreliable servants to the public good, no better
than government organs, and potentially much worse. Id. It is possible that a clearly
defined legal status for contractors is part of the solution to this problem. A simple and
predictable system distributing liability for the various things that occur in military
zones could be a very important element of accountability for these organizations.
39. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 102-03 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting).
Sovereign immunity took form in the thirteenth century as part of English common law
under the reign of Henry III. Id. at 103. The two-prong basis of sovereign immunity
(that the King could do no wrong and that he could not be sued in his own court)
existed through the Middle Ages and made its way in some form to the United States.
Id. The version of sovereign immunity that exists in the United States today does not
retain both prongs as its basis and rationale. See id. The idea that the King (or, in this
case, the United States) can do no wrong has certainly faded if it ever truly existed. Id.;
see Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139 (1950). The United States is held account
able for numerous wrongs today in its own courts. Feres, 340 U.S. at 140. The element
of sovereign immunity that has survived—to an extent—is that the King cannot be sued
in his own court. Id. at 139. In many cases, the United States has consented to suit in
its courts (for example, through the FTCA), but it still retains the basic presumption
that, barring its consent, it cannot be sued. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475-77
(1994).
40. See United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941) (“The United States,
as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued.”); Cohens v. Virginia,
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 380 (1821) (“[A] sovereign independent State is not suable,
except by its own consent.”).
41. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1953), abrogated by Rayonier,
Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 319 (1957). Congress had already waived sovereign
immunity for several types of claims and had a court established to hear such claims
but, in general, had not waived its immunity from standard common law torts. Id. at 25
n.10.
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which would have been in violation of the local law had they been
committed by an individual.42 The FTCA consisted of two main
components: the first was a waiver of sovereign immunity,43 and the
second was a list of exceptions for which the United States retained
its sovereign immunity.44 Of the many exceptions to the FTCA’s
waiver of sovereign immunity, the two most relevant to this Note
are the discretionary-function exception45 and the combatant-activi
ties exception.46 The discretionary-function exception preserves
the United States’s immunity from claims based on injuries attribu
table to the actions of federal officials making discretionary deci
sions, generally involving political or social policy.47 The
42. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006); Feres, 340 U.S. at 139-40; Gonzalez-Rucci v. INS, 460
F. Supp. 2d 307, 312 (D.P.R. 2006).
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1346. The language of the statute provides that the United States
district courts
shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United
States, for money damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or
loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrong
ful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the
scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United
States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with
the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.
Id. § 1346(b)(1).
44. Id. § 2680. The exceptions include instances where a discretionary function
was performed by a United States official; where mail was lost or negligently handled
by the United States Postal Service; where taxes, fees, or detention of goods by customs
agents was involved; where damages were allegedly caused by actions of the United
States Treasury; where injuries were suffered in connection with combatant activities;
and where claims arose in other countries. Id.; see also United States v. S.A. Empresa
de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 467 U.S. 797, 820-21 (1984) (holding that the discre
tionary-function exception to the FTCA barred a claim against the Federal Aviation
Administration alleging that it had negligently certified aircraft for flight); Kandarge v.
United States, 849 F. Supp. 304, 311 (D.N.J. 1994) (holding that the discretionary func
tion barred a suit against the United States where it had made the choice to delegate
worksite safety at an excavation to a private contractor).
45. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). The exception applies to
[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government,
exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not
such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance
or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the
part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not
the discretion involved be abused.
Id.
46. Id. § 2680(j). The exception applies to “[a]ny claim arising out of the combat
ant activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war.”
Id.
47. The discretionary-function exception was intended to prevent judicial intru
sion into the government’s decision-making process in areas of public policy. Riley v.
United States, 486 F.3d 1030, 1032 (8th Cir. 2007). To establish the applicability of the
discretionary-function exception, the government first must demonstrate that there was
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combatant-activities exception generally precludes claims arising
out of wartime combat.48
In sum, by waiving the United States’s sovereign immunity, ex
cept in limited instances, the FTCA expanded the scope of claims
that could be brought against the United States. Despite this
waiver, however, many claims remain statutorily barred by the ex
ceptions to the FTCA and thus will go uncompensated.49 This pro
tection of federal interests from the intrusion of state tort law
foreshadows many of the arguments that are central to this Note.
While the FTCA makes some concessions to state tort principles,50
it carves out a reserve of federal interests that are statutorily pro
tected.51 The conflict between the protection of federal interests
and the rights of individuals to seek redress for their injuries under
lies all of the conflict and controversy of the topic of this Note.52
III.

FERES

AND THE

FOUNDATION

OF

MILITARY IMMUNITY

Four years after the passage of the FTCA, the United States
Supreme Court decided Feres v. United States.53 In Feres, the Court
held that the United States military was not liable for soldiers’ inju
an action by the United States that “involv[ed] an element of judgment or choice.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). Second, it has to be shown that the action impacts
social, economic, or political policy. Id. In Riley, the court dismissed a claim against
the United States that alleged that the United States Postal Service’s placement of mail
boxes obscured the view of traffic and led to an automobile accident. Id. In effect, the
discretionary-function exception is a statutory embodiment of the separation of powers.
See Blessing v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 1160, 1171 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (“[T]here is
evidence within the FTCA’s legislative history that such fundamental separation of
powers dogma is precisely what the discretionary function exception was designed to
embody.”).
48. See Redmond v. United States, 331 F. Supp. 1222, 1223-24 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
49. For example, see Miller v. United States, in which a woman brought a claim
for infliction of emotional distress after alleged medical malpractice resulted in the
death of her husband—a military officer. 73 F.3d 878, 879 (9th Cir. 1995). The claim
was barred by an exception to the FTCA because it occurred in a foreign country. Id.
at 883.
50. This concession comes in the form of making itself liable to injuries—save for
those excepted—if they would be deemed tortious by the laws of the place they were
committed; that is, the states. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).
51. Id. § 2680. This reservation goes against the basic principle of the American
legal system that an injury deserves a remedy. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 147 (1803) (“It is a settled and invariable principle, that . . . every injury
[must have] its proper redress.”).
52. See United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 467 U.S.
797, 808 (1984) (“The discretionary function exception . . . marks the boundary between
Congress’s willingness to impose tort liability upon the United States and its desire to
protect certain governmental activities from exposure to suit by private individuals.”).
53. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
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ries suffered incident to service.54 The original Feres complaint al
leged that the military’s negligence in housing Feres in barracks
with a defective heating plant and failure to maintain adequate fireprevention measures resulted in his death.55 In barring Feres’s
claim, the Court gave broad immunity to the military for injuries
arising in the course of a soldier’s duties, whether those duties were
performed in peacetime or wartime and whether the duties were
pedestrian or high risk.56
The rationale for the decision in Feres was originally two pro
nged.57 The first prong—or “Feres factor,” as referred to by later
courts58—was based on the notion that the military is an entirely
federal concern and required uniform policies independent of the
state where the soldier served.59 The second Feres factor was the
recognition that federal statutes already provided “simple, certain,
and uniform compensation for injuries or death of those in armed
services.”60 The Court has held that these compensation schemes
54. Id. at 146.
55. Id. at 137. Feres was actually a decision for three separate cases; the opinion
also included Jefferson v. United States and Griggs v. United States. Id. at 136-37. The
actual Feres case came about after Rudolph Feres was required by his superior officers
to live in a barracks in Pine Camp, New York. Feres v. United States, 177 F.2d 535, 536
(2d Cir. 1949), aff’d, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). The barracks had a defective heating plant,
which the complaint alleged was known or should have been known by the superior
officers. Id. The complaint also alleged negligence on the part of the barracks’s fire
watch and its supervisors. Id.
The Jefferson claim stemmed from a surgery performed by an Army surgeon at
Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518, 519 (4th Cir. 1949),
aff’d sub nom. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135. A towel was left in Jefferson’s
body, resulting in serious injuries. Id. The claim brought on behalf of Dudley Griggs’s
widow in Griggs v. United States was similar; it alleged that the Army Medical Corps at
Scott Field Air Base, Illinois negligently executed a surgical procedure—a procedure
that proved to be fatal. Griggs v. United States, 178 F.2d 1, 2 (10th Cir. 1949), rev’d sub
nom. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135.
56. See McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1341 (11th Cir.
2007).
57. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 142-45.
58. See, e.g., Mossow v. United States, 987 F.2d 1365, 1370 (8th Cir. 1993).
59. Feres, 340 U.S. at 143-44.
60. Id. at 144. For injuries, the disability plan allows for an increasing monthly
compensation based on a percentage rating of disability. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1131, 1134
(2006). For example, someone rated ten percent disabled is entitled to $117 per month;
someone rated fifty percent disabled is entitled to $728 per month; and a fully (one
hundred percent) disabled person is entitled to $2,527 per month. Id. § 1114. There are
other, more specific provisions, which can further increase this amount. Id. In in
stances of death, the military compensation scheme provides for a $100,000 death gratu
ity paid out to the family of the deceased. 10 U.S.C. §§ 1475-79. The military can also
pay various expenses associated with death, including the cost of cremation, the
purchase of a casket, and others. Id. § 1482. Subsequently, the surviving spouse can
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represent a cap on the military’s liability to its soldiers and consti
tute the only means of relief for injured servicemen.61 These two
factors formed the basis of the decision in Feres and the initial back
bone of military immunity jurisprudence.
Feres has not been without its opponents. Critics have raised
many arguments against it over time, the strongest perhaps over the
inequity of the process it entails.62 In terms of both compensating
the injured and deterring future negligence, the Feres decision is
often found to be lacking.63 Despite the complaints, the Feres doc
trine has been reaffirmed in subsequent cases and is still good law.64
A. Brown, Johnson, and the Third Feres Factor
The Supreme Court added a third factor four years later in
United States v. Brown.65 There, the Court expressed concern
about the dangers posed to military discipline by the litigation of
claims brought by servicemen and servicewomen.66 In Brown, a
discharged soldier alleged medical negligence at a Veterans’ Ad
ministration Hospital during his surgery to correct an injury in
curred during military service.67 The Court read into the Feres
receive monthly payments that vary based on the rank of the deceased soldier, starting
at $1,091 per month. 38 U.S.C. § 1311. There are other available per-month increases,
including for disabled surviving spouses and dependent children. Id.
61. Feres, 340 U.S. at 144; see Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 444 U.S.
460, 464 (1980) (stating that the Veterans’ Benefit Act is believed to represent the ex
clusive route of compensation to injured servicemen); Stencel Aero Eng’g Corp. v.
United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673 (1977) (holding that the existing benefits package rep
resents a limitation on recovery); see also United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 690
(1987) (reaffirming these positions and noting the lack of a statutory amendment by
Congress in over four decades in response to this interpretation).
62. Edwin F. Hornbrook & Eugene J. Kirschbaum, The Feres Doctrine: Here Today—Gone Tomorrow?, 33 A.F. L. REV. 1, 11-15 (1990).
63. See id. at 11-15 (listing in a point-counterpoint method the arguments over
the inequitable nature of the Feres doctrine). While soldiers lose the right to win large
judgments in state court, they do have a benefits system set up to compensate them. Id.
at 12. While it “pale[s] next to multimillion dollar judgments, the military benefits sys
tem compares favorably to other benefits programs.” Id. One of the more lasting and
practical complaints against Feres has been the preclusion of medical malpractice claims
by active-duty soldiers. See id. at 16-18 (detailing legislative efforts to change the Feres
doctrine as applies to medical malpractice claims); see also Rob Perez, Active Duty
Military Can’t Sue for Malpractice, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Feb. 7, 2006, available at
http://the.honoluluadvertiser.com/article/2006/Feb/07/ln/FP602070329.html (showing
that this is still a concern today).
64. See Johnson, 481 U.S. 681.
65. United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 110-12 (1954).
66. Id. at 112.
67. Id. at 110. In United States v. Brown, Brown alleged that a defective tourni
quet was used on him in an operation by the Veterans’ Administration that occurred
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decision a recognition of both the special nature of military disci
pline and the potential untoward results of litigating allegedly negli
gent command decisions or orders.68 The Court found that the
Feres Court had read the FTCA to exclude claims that involved the
“peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superior.”69
The Brown Court ultimately decided that Feres did not control in
that case and thus provided little analysis of what eventually be
came the predominant Feres factor: military discipline.70
The Court more fully addressed the third factor in 1977 in
Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States.71 Stencel Aero in
volved a fighter pilot who suffered serious injury when his aircraft
malfunctioned.72 The case presented a new situation for the Court
because the pilot also sued the manufacturer, a military contractor,
who then cross-claimed against the military.73 The district court
ruled in favor of the United States on the claims of both the officer
and Stencel Aero.74 Stencel Aero appealed this decision and in do
ing so provided the Court an opportunity to address the Feres fac
tors in relation to nonmilitary claimants.75 Notably, the Court
analyzed the third factor, military discipline, and found no practical
difference to the military-discipline question if the claim came from
a serviceman or a third party.76 The Court found that “[t]he litiga
tion would take virtually the identical form in either case, and at
issue would be the degree of fault, if any, on the part of the Govern
ment’s agents and the effect upon the serviceman’s safety.”77 In
after his discharge from the military. Id. He suffered from severe and permanent nerve
damage in his leg because of the alleged negligence. Id. at 110-11.
68. Id. at 112.
69. Id.
The Feres decision . . . [held] that the Tort Claims Act does not cover injuries
to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity
incident to service. The peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his
superiors, the effects of the maintenance of such suits on discipline, and the
extreme results that might obtain if suits under the Tort Claims Act were al
lowed for negligent orders given or negligent acts committed in the course of
military duty, led the Court to read that Act as excluding claims of that
character.
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
70. See id.
71. Stencel Aero Eng’g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977).
72. Id. at 667.
73. See id. at 668.
74. Id. at 668-69.
75. Id. at 669-70.
76. Id. at 673.
77. Id.
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practical terms, the Court noted that no matter who brought the
suit, the trial would inherently involve questioning military decision
making and officers testifying to their decisions and the decisions of
other officers.78 The Court’s decision to reject the third-party claim
is another in a line of cases in which the relief is precluded for the
purpose of protecting the national interests of the United States—
in the form of its military.79
In contrast, Justice Marshall’s dissenting opinion in Stencel
Aero did not recognize any military-discipline issues at play.80 Jus
tice Marshall argued that, because it was a third-party claim and not
one by a soldier, there was no risk to military discipline.81 He fur
ther argued that the majority’s position created inconsistent results
because a civilian could bring a claim while a soldier’s claim would
be barred when both of their injuries stemmed from the exact same
event.82 Justice Marshall’s conception of the military-discipline fac
tor appeared to be rooted in an older view of the military-discipline
factor that was concerned primarily with the dangers of a
subordinate bringing suit against a superior officer.83 Over time,
78. Id. “The trial would, in either case, involve second-guessing military orders,
and would often require members of the Armed Services to testify in court as to each
other’s decisions and actions.” Id.
79. See id. at 673-74. The Court found the claim barred because the same factors
justifying the barring of Feres-type claims were present and potent in Stencel Aero’s
claim. Id. Here the Court showed judicial flexibility—the kind that will be called for
by this Note—to protect important federal interests.
80. Id. at 676 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall stated,
It is clear that the basis of Feres was the Court’s concern with the disruption of
“[t]he peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors” that
might result if the soldier were allowed to hale his superiors into court. That
problem does not arise when a nonmilitary third party brings suit.
Id. (citation omitted).
81. Id.
82. Id.
Had the same malfunction in the pilot eject system that caused the service
man’s injuries here also caused that system to plunge into a civilian’s house,
the injured civilian would unquestionably have a cause of action under the
Tort Claims Act against the Government. He might also sue petitioner, which
might, as it has done here, cross-claim against the Government. In that hypo
thetical case, as well as in the case before us, there would be the same chance
that the trial would involve second-guessing military orders, and would . . .
require members of the Armed Services to testify in court as to each other’s
decisions and actions. Yet there would be no basis, in Feres or in the Tort
Claims Act, for concluding that the suit is barred because of the nature of the
evidence to be produced at trial.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
83. See id. at 674-77.
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and notably in the cases that follow, the military-discipline factor
firmly takes on an evolved role in military-immunity doctrine.
Subsequent cases have reaffirmed and refined the usage of this
factor as a policy basis for the Feres ruling and military immunity.84
In United States v. Shearer, the Court further underscored the im
portance of this factor by articulating the way that such claims, by
their very nature, would involve the judiciary in military affairs in a
way that could compromise military discipline.85 Two years later, in
United States v. Johnson, the Court expanded and developed this
notion, stating that “[e]ven if military negligence is not specifically
alleged in a tort action, a suit based upon service-related activity
necessarily implicates the military judgments and decisions that are
inextricably intertwined with the conduct of the military mission.”86
In Johnson, a Coast Guard officer died during a rescue mission, and
his wife brought a claim against the government.87 The Court re
affirmed the Feres ruling and held that the government was not lia
ble for the death of the Coast Guard officer during his service.88
The Court also noted that “[b]ecause Johnson was acting pursuant
to standard operating procedures of the Coast Guard, the potential
that [the] suit could implicate military discipline [was]
substantial.”89
The Court also addressed the military-discipline and command
factor in United States v. Stanley.90 In the long line of cases in which
84. See United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681 (1987); United States v. Shearer,
473 U.S. 52 (1985).
85. Shearer, 473 U.S. at 59.
The plaintiffs in Feres and Stencel Aero Engineering did not contest the wis
dom of broad military policy; nevertheless, the Court held that their claims did
not fall within the Tort Claims Act because they were the type of claims that, if
generally permitted, would involve the judiciary in sensitive military affairs at
the expense of military discipline and effectiveness.
Id.
86. Johnson, 481 U.S. at 691. As well, the Johnson Court quotes its past decisions
in categorizing the military as “a specialized society.” Id. (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417
U.S. 733, 743 (1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court noted that “[t]o
accomplish its mission the military must foster instinctive obedience, unity, commit
ment, and esprit de corps.” Id. (quoting Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507
(1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
87. Id. at 683.
88. Id. at 692.
89. Id. at 691-92. Also in light of the Feres factors, namely that of the existing
statutory-benefits scheme, the Court pointed out that the decedent’s wife had re
ceived—and continued to receive—benefits from the government because of her hus
band’s death. Id. The wife was receiving $868 per month for dependency and
compensation benefits. Id. at 683 n.1.
90. 483 U.S. 669 (1987).

\\server05\productn\W\WNE\32-2\WNE204.txt

2010]

unknown

Seq: 15

24-MAY-10

IMMUNITY FOR MILITARY SERVICE CONTRACTORS

13:53

387

no remedy has been available because of the priority given to fed
eral interests, Stanley may be the most egregious example. James
Stanley, a Master Sergeant in the United States Army, was
deceived and used as an experimental subject by the Army in its
process of testing the effects of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD).91
At the time of the experiments, Stanley was unaware that he was a
test subject.92 Over time, Stanley’s personality changed, resulting in
the deterioration of his work performance, the subsequent dis
charge from the Army, and a divorce from his wife.93 Stanley suf
fered from hallucinations, memory loss, and became violent
towards his family.94 Despite the inhumane treatment by the
United States Army and the way in which its actions completely
destroyed Stanley’s life, the Court still held in favor of the
government.95
In Stanley, the Court stated that making the applicability of
Feres dependent on case-by-case analysis of how seriously a claim
would threaten military discipline would not work. Such a test
would inherently require the Court to intrude on military matters in
the process of evaluating the potential interference.96 Notably, the
court held that “the mere process of arriving at correct conclusions
would disrupt the military regime.”97 The Court went on to note
that such uninvited intrusions were inappropriate.98 It is ultimately
the concerns about military discipline, military decision making,
and the unique nature of the military that form the basis of the
decision in Stanley; the other Feres factors are not nearly as pro
nounced.99 This result shows the importance the Court places on
91. Id. at 671.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 686. The gravity of the injuries was not lost on the Court, as evidenced
by the opinions of Justices Brennan and O’Connor. See id. at 686-708 (Brennan, J.,
concurring and dissenting); id. at 708-10 (O’Connor, J., concurring and dissenting).
96. Id. at 682 (majority opinion).
A test for liability that depends on the extent to which particular suits would
call into question military discipline and decisionmaking would itself require
judicial inquiry into, and hence intrusion upon, military matters. Whether a
case implicates those concerns would often be problematic, raising the pros
pect of compelled depositions and trial testimony by military officers concern
ing the details of their military commands.
Id. at 682-83.
97. Id. at 683.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 683-84; see Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 562 (5th Cir. 1985)
(“Since Stencel, it has become clear that the third factor described above [concern for
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protecting federal interests—specifically in the context of the
military.
While the deference to the government provided by the Feres
doctrine is very strong, the question remains as to how it could be
applied to the same interests (military decision making and disci
pline) present in military-contractor relations. To answer this ques
tion, an analysis of government-contractor immunity is necessary.
IV. GOVERNMENT-CONTRACTOR IMMUNITY
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

AND

DERIVATIVE

Outside of the military realm, there is an extensive history of
derivative sovereign immunity for those acting at the will of the
government.100 In Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Construction Co., the Su
preme Court held that an agent of the government was not amena
ble to suit when carrying out the will of Congress.101 In such cases,
the Court held, the only way for the agent to be liable would be if
he acted outside the bounds of his authority or if there was no legit
imate power to give that authority.102
military discipline] is the principal justification for the Feres-Stencel doctrine.”). For a
discussion on the emergence of military discipline as the primary category for consider
ation of Feres doctrine positions, see Seidelson, supra note 20, at 226-30.
100. See Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 21 (1940) (holding that,
on citizen’s action against government contractor who had damaged part of citizen’s
land in the process of performing its duties, contractor could not be sued if it satisfacto
rily carried out the contractual obligations set by the United States); see also Myers v.
United States, 323 F.2d 580, 583 (9th Cir. 1963) (holding that no liability could be im
posed upon a government contractor for damage done to the property of the appellant
when appellee was acting within the terms of its contract with the United States); Green
v. ICI Am., 362 F. Supp. 1263, 1265 (E.D. Tenn. 1973) (holding that the government
contractor operating a United States-owned TNT plant shared the United States’s sov
ereign immunity in claims related to the plant and thus could not be sued).
101. Yearsley, 309 U.S. at 20-21 (“[I]f this authority to carry out the project was
validly conferred, that is, if what was done was within the constitutional power of Con
gress, there is no liability on the part of the contractor for executing its will.”); see also
Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 283 (1855) (cited
in Yearsley and holding that a public agent acting within his bounds “cannot be made
responsible in a judicial tribunal for obeying the lawful command of the government”).
102. Yearsley, 309 U.S. at 20-21; see also Myers, 323 F.2d at 583 (holding that a
contractor building roads for the government within the parameters of its instructions
was not liable for any claims). An important element of contractor immunity is the
consistent requirement that the contractor be acting within its bounds. The courts have
held that a contractor should never be immune from suits based in injuries caused by
the contractor’s own fault. See Foster v. Day & Zimmermann Inc., 502 F.2d 867, 874
(8th Cir. 1974) (“The doctrine of sovereign immunity may not be extended to cover the
fault of a private corporation, no matter how intimate its connection with the
government.”).

R
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An interesting example of derivative immunity was presented
in the Fourth Circuit case Butters v. Vance International, Inc. 103 In
Butters, the Saudi government rejected the female plaintiff’s appli
cation for full-time employment as a security guard.104 The Saudi
government rejected her because it would have violated its Islamic
principles to have a female security officer.105 Butters then brought
a claim of gender discrimination against the United States security
company.106 The court ultimately found that, because the decision
not to hire Butters was made by the Saudi government and was a
noncommercial decision particular to the sovereign, the security
company derived the sovereign immunity of Saudi Arabia and was
thus immune from suit by Butters.107 The court noted that it is
“well-settled law that contractors and common law agents acting
within the scope of their employment for the United States have
derivative sovereign immunity.”108 While this “well-settled law”
applied generally to government contractors, contractor immunity
tailored specifically to military contractors developed in the area of
military products procurement.
A. Military Contractor Immunity—Products Liability
The Fourth Circuit established military-contractor immunity in
Tozer v. LTV Corp. 109 Tozer was another case of military aviation
disaster, involving a crashed Navy airplane.110 A substantial por
tion of the court’s argument was based in a concern for the separa
103. Butters v. Vance Int’l, Inc., 225 F.3d 462 (4th Cir. 2000).
104. Id. at 464.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 465-67.
108. Id. at 466. The court went on to state,
Sovereign immunity exists because it is in the public interest to protect the
exercise of certain governmental functions. This public interest remains intact
when the government delegates that function down the chain of command. As
a result, courts define the scope of sovereign immunity by the nature of the
function being performed—not by the office or the position of the particular
employee involved. Imposing liability on private agents of the government
would directly impede the significant governmental interest in the completion
of its work. As a result, courts have extended derivative immunity to private
contractors, “particularly in light of the government’s unquestioned need to
delegate governmental functions.”
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Mangold v. Analytic Servs., Inc., 77 F.3d 1442, 1448 (4th
Cir. 1996)); see Daniel G. Murphy et al., Parallel Proceedings: Moving into Cyberspace,
35 INT’L LAW. 491, 504-05 (2001).
109. 792 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1986).
110. Id. at 404.
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tion of powers.111 The court noted that “[t]he judicial branch is by
design the least involved in military matters” and that “[i]n the face
of a ‘textually demonstrable’ commitment of an issue to ‘a coordi
nate political department,’ judicial caution is advisable.”112 The
court quoted from Gilligan v. Morgan, a 1973 Supreme Court deci
sion, stating that “[t]he complex, subtle, and professional decisions
as to the composition, training, equipping, and control of a military
force are essentially professional military judgments, subject always
to civilian control of the Legislative and Executive Branches.”113
The court also pointed out that even if there was no separation of
powers mandated by the Constitution, separation remains sound
policy because judges are inherently less suited to evaluate military
decisions than the military and civilian-military personnel.114 The
court noted that such serious decisions should not be made by the
“least accountable branch of government.”115
In outlining the merits of the military-contractor defense, the
Tozer court strongly dismissed the notion that there would be a dif
ference in impact on the military if the claim were brought against a
contractor as opposed to against the military itself.116 The court
noted that contractors are so intertwined with the military that it is
virtually impossible to criticize them without simultaneously criti
cizing, or at least questioning, the military in the same matter.117
The court then recognized the importance of evaluating military de
cision making but left such evaluation firmly in the hands of the
executive and legislative branches, not the courts.118 The court also
argued that the relationship between the military and its contrac
tors and the collaborative process of their work requires military

111. Id. at 405.
112. Id. (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
113. Id. (quoting Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
114. Id. (“The judicial branch contains no Department of Defense or Armed Ser
vices Committee or other ongoing fund of expertise on which its personnel may
draw.”); see also In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation, 534 F. Supp. 1046,
1054 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (“Considerations of cost, time of production, risks to partici
pants, risks to third parties, and any other factors that might weigh on the decisions of
whether, when, and how to use a particular weapon, are uniquely questions for the
military and should be exempt from review by civilian courts.”).
115. Tozer, 792 F.2d at 405.
116. Id. at 406.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 406-07.
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contractor immunity both to maintain quality and limit costs.119 On
the basis of these concerns, the court decided to recognize a mili
tary version of government-contractor immunity established in
Yearsley.120
The Supreme Court would take up the issue of militarycontractor immunity in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. where it
recognized and established the test for military-contractor immu
nity for products liability.121 Boyle centered on the death of a
United States Marine helicopter pilot and the subsequent suit the
pilot’s father filed against the helicopter manufacturer.122 A pri
mary focus of the Court’s decision was the tension between the
wholly federal role of military contractors and the fundamental
concepts of state tort law.123 Boyle held that federal law can super
sede state tort law, even without statutory authorization, in cases
that represent a “uniquely federal interest[ ].”124 Two uniquely fed
eral interests were presented in Boyle: “obligations to and rights of
the United States under its contracts”125 and “the civil liability of
federal officials for actions taken in the course of their duty.”126
Despite the fact that the suit was nominally against the contractor,
it was sufficiently related to a contract involving the United States
to be considered within the first interest.127 As well, the policy

119. Id. at 407-08; see also McKay v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 450 (9th
Cir. 1983) (detailing the benefits to the military’s relationship with contractors that a
contractor immunity would bring).
120. See Tozer, 792 F.2d at 409.
121. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512-14 (1988). For a general
discussion of Boyle, its rationales and significance, see William C. Buckhold & Lisa D.
Goekjian, The Government Contractor’s Defense to Products Liability Claims, 99 COM.
L.J. 64 (1994), and John J. Michels, Jr., The Government Contractor Defense: The Limits
of Immunity After Boyle, 33 A.F. L. REV. 147 (1990).
122. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 502.
123. Id. at 504-06.
124. Id. at 504. In general, preemption of state law is primarily handled by ex
plicit language of preemption on the part of Congress. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State
Energy Res. Conservation, 461 U.S. 190, 203 (1983). Preemption is not limited to those
cases, however. State law can also be preempted where there is a scheme of federal
regulation so complete that it is reasonable to assume that Congress intended it not to
be supplemented by state law. Id. at 204. Further, state law can be preempted where
there is federal law on a topic of dominant federal interest or where the Congress
reveals its intent to preempt otherwise. Id.
125. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 504.
126. Id. at 505.
127. Id. at 505-06.
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goals of the second interest are maintained whether a federal offi
cial is involved directly or not.128
Though the Court acknowledged that suits between private
parties unrelated to the United States are left to state tort law, it
distinguished Boyle, pointing out that because “[t]he imposition of
liability on Government contractors will directly affect the terms of
Government contracts . . . the interests of the United States will be
directly affected.”129 The Court went on to note the necessity of a
“significant conflict” to justify the imposition of federal law over
state tort policies.130 It found this significant conflict in the “discre
tionary function” exception of the FTCA.131
The Court also raised the issue of costs, noting that allowing
contractors to be sued would likely raise the costs of contracting
with the government.132 The cost of liability would ultimately be
passed onto the government in its contract pricing.133 This transfer
of costs creates an inconsistency that the court noted: “It makes
little sense to insulate the Government against financial liability for
the judgment that a particular feature of military equipment is nec
essary when the Government produces the equipment itself, but not
when it contracts for the production.”134 This concern—interfer
ence with the government’s ability to contract—is a major element
of the Boyle Court’s decision to preempt state tort law.135
A test ultimately emerged from Boyle that allows for immunity
from suit for contractors in situations in which (1) the United States
approved design specifications, (2) the materials produced by a ci
128. Id. at 505 (“The present case involves an independent contractor performing
its obligation under a procurement contract, rather than an official performing his duty
as a federal employee, but there is obviously implicated the same interest in getting the
Government’s work done.”).
129. Id. at 507.
130. Id. at 507-11.
131. Id. at 511-12. The discretionary-function exception excludes “[a]ny claim . . .
based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discre
tionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Govern
ment, whether or not the discretion involved be abused,” from the broad consent to suit
established in the FTCA. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2006).
132. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511-12.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 512.
135. See John Watts, Differences Without Distinctions: Boyle’s Government Con
tractor Defense Fails to Recognize the Critical Differences Between Civilian and Military
Plaintiffs and Between Military and Non-Military Procurement, 60 OKLA. L. REV. 647,
679 (2007) (“The Boyle Court justified the creation of the federal common law defense
on the need to prevent cost increases . . . and the impermissible interference such costs
would have on government discretion in procurement.”).
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vilian contractor met those specifications, and (3) the contractor
warned the United States about any dangers in the use of the
materials of which it was aware but the United States was not.136
The third element of the test, the Court stated, was necessary to
create disincentives for contractors to withhold information from
the military about potential dangers.137 In designing this test, the
Court rejected a test proposed by the Eleventh Circuit,138 which
would have required either (1) that the contractor not participate
substantially in the design or (2) that the contractor warn the gov
ernment and present alternative designs but be told to proceed with
the original specifications anyway.139 Boyle’s broad use of the discretionary-function exception has led to inconsistent use of the
standard, including its use in situations not directly called for in
Boyle, such as nonmilitary government contracting.140
The Boyle standard was used in a progressive way by the Elev
enth Circuit in Hudgens v. Bell Helicopters/Textron.141 As a depar
ture from the typical Boyle fact scenario, Hudgens involved a
services contract, not a products-procurement contract.142 The neg
ligence alleged in Hudgens concerned the maintenance of United
States Army helicopters.143 The Hudgens court held that the true
thrust of Boyle is not that manufacturers should be protected in
military-procurement contracts, but rather that state tort law can be
displaced by the unique federal interest of control over government
136. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512. The Court’s specific language for the test read,
Liability for design defects in military equipment cannot be imposed, pursuant
to state law, when (1) the United States approved reasonably precise specifica
tions; (2) the equipment conformed to those specifications; and (3) the sup
plier warned the United States about the dangers in the use of the equipment
that were known to the supplier but not to the United States.
Id.
137. Id. at 512-13.
138. See Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 746 (11th Cir. 1985).
139. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 513. The Court did not want to discourage active involve
ment by the contractor in the design process. See Shaw, 778 F.2d at 746.
140. See Watts, supra note 135, at 668-69 (“[T]he majority of courts addressing
the issue have applied the government contractor defense to non-military contracts.
These courts have focused upon the broad application of the discretionary function
exception supporting Boyle and the undesirability of judicial second-guessing of federal
policy decisions that necessarily occurs in the absence of the defense.” (footnote omit
ted)). This arguably overbroad interpretation of the discretionary function was first
pointed out by the dissent in Boyle, which argued that the FTCA itself was not even
applicable to the situation and, therefore, one of its exceptions could not be invoked in
any reasonable way. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 526-28 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
141. Hudgens v. Bell Helicopters/Textron, 328 F.3d 1329 (11th Cir. 2003).
142. Id. at 1330.
143. Id.

R
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contracts and protection of the government’s ability to get its work
done.144 The court decided that the determination of specifications
for product designs involves the same type of discretion as the deci
sion of how to maintain a military air fleet, thus justifying the invo
cation of the discretionary-function exception.145 Based on this
broad reading, the court held that the Boyle rationale and test
could be used in the case presented to them, even though it was a
service contract.146
For the purpose of the Hudgens analysis, the elements of the
Boyle test were modified to suit the service contract.147 The court’s
new test was tailored specifically to the maintenance contractor
facts and allowed for immunity “if (1) the United States approved
reasonably precise maintenance procedures; (2) [the contractor’s]
performance of maintenance conformed to those procedures; and
(3) [the contractor] warned the United States about the dangers in
reliance on the procedures that were known to [the contractor] but
not to the United States.”148 This expansion of products-liability
immunity to the services context is unique to the Eleventh Circuit
and has not been followed in any other jurisdiction.149

144. Id. at 1333-34. “Although Boyle referred specifically to procurement con
tracts, the analysis it requires is not designed to promote all-or-nothing rules regarding
different classes of contract. Rather, the question is whether subjecting a contractor to
liability under state tort law would create a significant conflict with a unique federal
interest.” Id. at 1334.
145. Id.
The formulation of design specifications and the articulation of maintenance
protocols involve the exercise of the very same discretion to decide how a
military fleet of airworthy craft will be readied. Holding a contractor liable
under state law for conscientiously maintaining military aircraft according to
specified procedures would threaten government officials’ discretion in pre
cisely the same manner as holding contractors liable for departing from design
specifications.
Id.
146. Id. at 1333-34.
147. Id. at 1335-38.
148. Id. at 1335; see supra note 136.
149. See Fisher v. Halliburton, 390 F. Supp. 2d 610, 615-16 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (dis
cussing the courts’ hesitance to apply the Boyle test to service contracts and rejecting an
effort to expand that immunity); see also Smith v. Halliburton Co., No. H-06-0462, 2006
WL 2521326, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 30, 2006) (discussing the limited history of military
service-contractor immunity); McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 2d
1315, 1329-31 (M.D. Fla. 2006) (explaining the argument for the application of Boyle
only to products-procurement contracts), aff’d, 502 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2007).

R
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B. Claims for Derivative Feres Immunity and Further
Developments in Military-Contractor Immunity
The first federal appellate court to hear a case arguing for de
rivative Feres immunity for military contractors was the Ninth Cir
cuit Court of Appeals in Chapman v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.150
Chapman involved an on-duty serviceman who was injured when a
platform collapsed at a government-owned nuclear facility run by
Westinghouse Corp.151 The court rejected the notion of derivative
Feres immunity and instead sought to apply the Feres doctrine di
rectly, which required testing to see if Westinghouse qualified as a
government employee.152 Because the Feres doctrine only applies
to suits against the government and its employees, Westinghouse
would have had to be an employee of the United States for immu
nity to apply.153 Noting that the government contract clearly de
fined Westinghouse as a contractor seeking its own profit, the Ninth
Circuit found the corporation was not a government employee and
thus held Feres inapplicable.154 The court dismissed the claim for
Feres-based immunity and instead focused on the Boyle test, based
in the discretionary-function exception.155 The court noted that
Boyle had a broader potential reach than Feres because Boyle could
bar suits against private parties.156 Because the court could not find
any evidence of precise specifications for the platform, it found the
Boyle test also to be inapplicable.157
The various issues of contractor immunity discussed above
converged in McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., in which the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals heard a claim for derivative
Feres immunity in a case involving a service contract.158 Presiden
tial Airways had contracted with the United States to fly military
150. Chapman v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 911 F.2d 267 (9th Cir. 1990); see McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1341 n.10. In seeking derivative immunity, a defendant is attempt
ing to assert that its relationship to an immune entity (for the purpose of this Note, the
United States) affords it the immunity of the United States. See Murphy, supra note
108, at 504-05.
151. Chapman, 911 F.2d at 268.
152. Id. at 271.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 270-72.
156. Id. at 271.
157. Id. This analysis represents an example of the application of Boyle. The
court made it through only one prong of the three-part test but did seek to apply the
Boyle test and looked for precise specifications that would justify immunity. Id.
158. McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1338-57 (11th Cir.
2007).
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officers and personnel to and from various locations in the Middle
East.159 One of its trips unfortunately ended in a crash that proved
fatal to three United States servicemen.160 The survivors brought
suit against Presidential Airways on behalf of the deceased soldiers
in Florida state court, alleging that it had caused the wrongful death
of the soldiers.161
Presidential Airways argued that it should be immune under
the Feres doctrine, but the Eleventh Circuit disagreed.162 Unlike
Chapman, however, the court did not base its decision on the no
tion that Feres could not apply to suits against nongovernment enti
ties.163 Instead, the Eleventh Circuit engaged the concept of
derivative Feres immunity presented by Presidential Airways.164
First the court analyzed Presidential Airways’s claim that, as a com
mon law agent, it was entitled to the government’s sovereign immu
nity.165 The court never decided whether Presidential Airways was
a common law agent, but it did disagree with Presidential Airways’s
position that, if it was, it would be entitled to derivative sovereign
immunity.166 To the McMahon court, common law agency was not
dispositive but instead a part of the derivative-immunity analysis.167
Without deciding the agency question, the court assumed arguendo
that the airline was a government agent and analyzed Presidential
Airways’s assertion that it was entitled to some measure of Feres
immunity.168
The court then considered the Feres doctrine and found that it
was simultaneously too broad and too narrow to be applied in the
claim against Presidential Airways.169 The doctrine was too broad,
the court held, because it allowed immunity for any injury “incident
to service,” which would protect contractors from things well
159. Id. at 1336.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1356.
163. Id. at 1338; see Chapman v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 911 F.2d 267, 271 (9th
Cir. 1990).
164. McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1338.
165. Id. at 1342-46.
166. Id. at 1344.
167. Id. at 1345.
168. Id. at 1346.
169. Id. at 1355. The court’s complaints about Feres were virtually identical to
those made by the Supreme Court in Boyle: “[I]t seems to us that the Feres doctrine, in
its application to the present problem, logically produces results that are in some re
spects too broad and in some respects too narrow.” Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487
U.S. 500, 510 (1988).
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outside the policy aims supported by Feres.170 Additionally, the
doctrine was held to be too narrow in that it only provided immu
nity from suits by soldiers, not by civilians.171 This paradoxical set
of weaknesses of the Feres doctrine as applied to the McMahon
facts would produce absurd results—such as having the claims on
behalf of the soldiers completely barred regardless of merit—yet
would allow for claims against Presidential Airways by any nonmili
tary personnel on board the crashed flight.172 Because of these
faults in the Feres argument, the court rejected its application.173
The court did recognize the fact that the third Feres factor, a
fear of interference and evaluation of sensitive military decisions,
was applicable to the McMahon facts.174 Despite finding the other
two factors inapplicable175 and ultimately rejecting Presidential
Airways’s derivative Feres claims,176 the court found that the value
of the all-important third factor could merit some level of immunity
for Presidential Airways.177 The court went on to suggest that this
standard for immunity would be somewhere between “incident to
service” and the political-question doctrine.178 It would need to be
less than “incident to service” for the same reason that the “inci
dent to service” standard of Feres made that doctrine too broad,
namely that it would protect contractors from liability in virtually
all of their actions, regardless of negligence.179 The questions then
170. McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1355; see Boyle, 487 U.S. at 510.
171. McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1355; see Boyle, 487 U.S. at 510.
172. McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1355. The court presented an example of such an
absurd result:
Assume also three people injured by the contractor’s performance of the sen
sitive military function: a soldier, a civilian employee of the private contractor,
and a journalist. If we extended Feres derivatively to the private contractor,
the soldier could not sue the contractor. The employee of the private contrac
tor could sue because, by hypothesis, the suit would not be barred by the polit
ical question doctrine. And so could the journalist, for the same reason.
Id. at 1354.
173. Id. at 1355.
174. Id. at 1348-52. The McMahon court raised the issues of an institutional lack
of competence in the judiciary to evaluate military decisions and also made a strong
argument that separation of powers precludes the courts from intruding on military
decisions left to the two political branches. Id. at 1349-50.
175. Id. at 1346-47.
176. Id. at 1356.
177. Id. at 1351 (“We thus acknowledge that private contractor agents may be
entitled to some form of immunity that protects their making or executing sensitive
military judgments, and that overlaps and possibly extends beyond the protection pro
vided by the political question doctrine.”).
178. Id.
179. Id.
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posed by the court were whether the political-question doctrine was
too narrow and whether there were instances in which Presidential
Airways could merit immunity while at the same time not requiring
the court to directly consider a political question.180 Ultimately, the
court did not answer these questions and instead left them merely
as suggestions.181
V.

THE BOYLE TEST SHOULD BE APPLIED
SERVICE CONTRACTORS

TO

Civilian companies who contract to provide services to the
United States military should receive immunity from civil liability
in cases where they have acted in compliance with specific direc
tions of the United States military. This immunity is necessary for
two reasons. First, it is necessary to protect the discretion of the
United States in its military contracts, discretion that would be
threatened by contract liability for actions performed by a contrac
tor under the direction of the United States. Second, a servicecontractor immunity is necessary to maintain the internal discipline
of the United States military, which could be threatened if regular
tort analysis was applied to the orders and directions given to mili
tary contractors.
This Note will analyze the Feres doctrine and will argue that
Feres is structurally inappropriate for application in these scenarios.
Then this Note will consider the political-question doctrine and will
argue that it does not provide broad and consistent enough cover
age to meet all of the potential scenarios. Finally, the Note will
argue that a modified version of the Boyle test represents the most
balanced, fair, and consistent way to provide the necessary immu
nity for military service contractors. This test would grant immu
nity to contractors in any case where (1) the United States military
180. Id. For a description and analysis of the political-question doctrine by the
Supreme Court, see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962). The Court placed a large
amount of emphasis on the separation of powers, stating that “[t]he nonjusticiability of
a political question is primarily a function of the separation of powers.” Id. The politi
cal-question doctrine, in general, prevents courts from hearing claims that present is
sues committed to another branch of the government. See Morgan McCue Sport, An
Inconvenient Suit: California v. General Motors Corporation and a Look at Whether
Global Warming Constitutes an Actionable Public Nuisance or a Nonjusticiable Political
Question, 38 CUMB. L. REV. 583, 619-21 (2008). The basis of the American politicalquestion doctrine lies, like many jurisprudential concepts, in Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803). There, the Court stated that “[q]uestions, in their
nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive,
can never be made in this court.” Id.
181. McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1355-56.
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had given a contractor a reasonably specific outline of their contrac
tual duties, (2) the contractor had performed its duties satisfacto
rily, and (3) the contractor had apprised the United States of any
risks or dangers it knew of concerning its contractual duties.
Through this test, immunity would be fairly invoked in cases where
contractors caused injuries or damages merely through following
the orders given to them by the United States military.
A. Military Service Contractors Should Receive Some Level of
Immunity
Military service contractors should receive some level of immu
nity because the same concerns that substantiate immunity in mili
tary products-procurement situations exist in the service-contractor
sector as well. The same concern exists for allowing the govern
ment to get its work done and have discretion in determining its
contracts. There also exists the concern that military discipline is
threatened by litigation over military contracts.
1. The Threat to Military Discipline
While the concern for military discipline was not even an ele
ment of the Feres decision, it has undoubtedly become the most
substantial of the Feres factors.182 The potential exists in suits
brought against military service contractors to significantly impact
military discipline.183 These suits would be brought against contrac
tors whose actions were dictated at least in part by the terms of
their government contract.184 Because of this contractual obliga
182. See Seidelson, supra note 20, at 226-30 (discussing the evolving changes to
the discipline rationale, beginning with its absence in Feres, and continuing until it be
came the controlling rationale in Shearer); see also Astley, supra note 20, at 217-19
(discussing the Court’s use in Johnson of the other nondiscipline Feres factors, despite
having been rendered noncontrolling in earlier decisions).
183. See Seidelson, supra note 20, at 229-30 (explaining how the entire rationale
of Feres becomes “[j]udicial second-guessing of military acts and decisions [that] would
have an adverse effect on military discipline”). It is important for this discussion of the
military-discipline factor to see that it is no longer truly about the conflict between
officers and their subordinates but has evolved into something else—a question of the
impacts of judicial interference into the military’s decision-making process. See United
States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 681-91 (1987).
184. See Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 406 (4th Cir. 1986). In Tozer, the
court noted within the context of products-procurement contracts that the contractors
and the military work “so closely” together that to criticize the contractor inherently
criticizes the military. Id. This situation repeats itself in service contracts where the
government and the contractors work together to build a set of parameters for the
performance of the service, much as the military works with its products contractors to
come up with a design for a product. If a court were to criticize a plan executed by a

R
R
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tion, a claim against the contractor could very likely require the
court to make qualitative assessments of protocols and procedures
determined by the United States military and its officers. It does
not matter that the claim is not brought against the military and
that there is no allegation of negligence against the military, since
“a suit based upon service-related activity necessarily implicates the
military judgments and decisions that are inextricably intertwined
with the conduct of the military mission.”185 Thus, a suit brought
against a military contractor could likely result in the court analyz
ing and criticizing the decisions of the United States military.
Courts have neither the competence nor the constitutional
power to judge decisions made by the military. Courts are not com
petent to analyze the decisions of the military because they lack the
expertise necessary to formulate a standard of care to determine
whether the decisions of the military adequately balance interests in
safety and effectiveness.186 A court simply could not establish a
competent standard of care for how well the military balances all of
its considerations when it makes a decision.187 As well, for the
court to consider these military decisions would violate the separa
tion of powers doctrine, since oversight of military decisions is ex
clusively left to the legislative and the executive branches by the
Constitution.188 This logic applies with equal strength to the mili
military contractor, it would implicate the military just as much as the contractor. Id.;
see also McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1336 (military retained control over what flights would
be flown, where to, and with who onboard); Hudgens v. Bell Helicopters/Textron, 328
F.3d 1329, 1331 (11th Cir. 2003) (military controlled the frequency and thoroughness of
maintenance inspections on helicopters).
185. Johnson, 481 U.S. at 691. The Johnson Court pointed out that judicial analy
sis of civilian activities can be just as potent an attack on military discipline as a direct
analysis of the military judgment itself. Id. at 691 n.11; see also Stencel Aero Eng’g
Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673 (1977) (holding that the impact on military
decision making will not depend on the target of the suit—the military contractor or the
military itself—as it would “in either case, involve second-guessing military orders”).
186. McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1350. The Eleventh Circuit in McMahon quoted
from Gilligan v. Morgan, which stated, “[I]t is difficult to conceive of an area of govern
mental activity in which the courts have less competence. The complex subtle, and
professional decisions as to the composition, training, equipping, and control of a mili
tary force are essentially professional military judgments . . . .” Gilligan v. Morgan, 413
U.S. 1, 10 (1973).
187. McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1350 (“Where sensitive military judgments are in
volved, courts lack the capacity to determine the proper tradeoff between military ef
fectiveness and the risk of harm to the soldiers.”).
188. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; id. art. II, § 2; see United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S.
669, 682 (1987) (noting “the insistence (evident from the number of Clauses devoted to
the subject) with which the Constitution confers authority over the Army, Navy, and
militia upon the political branches”); McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1350-51.
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tary’s use of contractors. It would violate separation of powers for
the court to interfere with military plans executed by military con
tractors, since the decisions still belong to the military regardless of
who brings them to completion.189 The Supreme Court has held
that these concerns for military decision making justify a doctrine of
immunity in various circumstances.190
Military service contractors are entitled to some level of immu
nity in situations where judicial attempts to determine contractor
liability would require the court to stick its nose into the military
decision-making process. For example, the court would be called
on to entertain questions over what would be a safe flight plan for a
military contractor transporting soldiers, what are appropriate
safety protocols for bodyguards protecting important persons visit
ing Iraq, or what are reasonable schedules of contracted mainte
nance for military aircraft. Even if a court could fairly assess a
negligence claim in such specialized contexts, the very process of
doing so would interfere in military decision making and violate the
separation of powers.191
189.

McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1350-51. The court stated,

It would similarly violate separation of powers for the courts to interfere
with sensitive military judgments made or executed by private contractor
agents of the military. The military has the constitutionally exclusive authority
to make those kinds of judgments, and judicial oversight of the private con
tractor agents the military uses to execute those judgments would likewise vio
late separation of powers principles.
Id.; see Harry A. Austin, Boyle v. United Technologies Corporation: A Questionable
Expansion of the Government Contract Defense, 23 GA. L. REV. 227, 235 (1988) (“Sev
eral courts have relied upon the [separation of powers] doctrine as a sufficient justifica
tion for the adoption of the government contract defense.”).
190. See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 511-13 (1988) (using the
concern for military decision making as a supporting rationale for its creation of an
immunity standard for military-products contractors); Stanley, 483 U.S. at 682-83 (hold
ing that merely entertaining the questions—even if they could obtain the right answers—would disrupt military decision making, precluding a case-by-case analysis of
military-discipline interference); Johnson, 481 U.S. at 691-92 (using the militarydiscipline question as part of the Feres-factor analysis); United States v. Shearer, 473
U.S. 52, 57-59 (1985) (holding that the discipline and decision-making factor was the
sole factor left justifying and substantiating the Feres doctrine); Stencel Aero, 431 U.S.
at 673 (holding that the discipline-and-decision-making factor applied just as strongly in
cases against contractors as in cases against the military); United States v. Brown, 348
U.S. 110, 143-44 (1954) (introducing the concerns for military discipline into the Feres
doctrine discussion); Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 405 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that
the concern for military decision making and separation of powers substantiated an
immunity for a military contractor).
191. See, e.g., Stanley, 483 U.S. at 683 (“[T]he mere process of arriving at correct
conclusions would disrupt the military regime.”).
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2. The Discretionary-Function Exemption to the FTCA and
the Boyle Analysis
The impropriety of judicial intrusion into military decision
making is further demonstrated by the Supreme Court’s treatment
of the discretionary-function exemption to the FTCA.192 In Boyle,
the Court used the discretionary-function exemption of the FTCA
as the main rationale for the military-contractor immunity it estab
lished.193 This same rationale is used in the service-contractor con
text, where the chance for interference with discretionary military
decisions is equally present.194 To justify its use of the discretionary-function exemption as the basis of an immunity standard, the
Court stated that the “[selection of designs] often involves not
merely engineering analysis but judgment as to the balancing of
many technical, military, and even social considerations, including
specifically the trade-off between greater safety and greater combat
effectiveness.”195 All of these considerations can and do apply for
service contracts. The military, in deciding the parameters within
which its service contractors will work, must balance safety, effec
192. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511 (“And we are further of the view that permitting
‘second-guessing’ of these judgments . . . through state tort suits against contractors
would produce the same effect sought to be avoided by the FTCA exemption.” (cita
tions omitted)).
193. Id. at 510-12; see Watts, supra note 135, at 649-50, 655-58 (describing the
Court’s concern that the costs of liability would ultimately be transferred to the United
States and would thus infringe on its powers to make discretionary decisions affecting
social, economic, or political policy).
194. Hudgens v. Bell Helicopters/Textron, 328 F.3d 1329, 1334 (11th Cir. 2003).
The court stated,
Although Boyle referred specifically to procurement contracts, the analy
sis it requires is not designed to promote all-or-nothing rules regarding differ
ent classes of contract. . . . We would be exceedingly hard-pressed to conclude
that the unique federal interest recognized in Boyle . . . [is] not likewise mani
fest in the present case. The formulation of design specifications and the artic
ulation of maintenance protocols involve the exercise of the very same
discretion to decide how a military fleet of airworthy craft will be readied.
Holding a contractor liable under state law for conscientiously maintaining mili
tary aircraft according to specified procedures would threaten government offi
cials’ discretion in precisely the same manner as holding contractors liable for
departing from design specifications.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
195. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511. The Court went on to discuss how the liability of the
contractor would be paid in the contract fees of the United States and thus represented
a nonsensical position, whereby the United States would be shielded from financial
liability when it made its own products but not when it ordered the products from a
military contractor. Id. at 512. This same idea applies to service contracts, whereby the
cost of litigation would be passed on to the United States government. This reality
carries just as much sense as the situation the Court identified in Boyle. See id.

R
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tiveness, cost, and many other factors within a context that is
unique to the military and quite different from that of state tort law.
For the purpose of this Note’s analysis, it is best to take the
Boyle analysis step-by-step and analogize it to military service con
tracts. The Boyle analysis requires that, to preempt state law con
cerns, the competing concern must be a “unique[ ] federal
interest[ ].”196 In Boyle, the court found that the government’s ob
ligations and responsibilities in forming and satisfying contracts to
be a uniquely federal interest.197 This unique federal interest also
exists in performance or service contracts. Based on the extensive
history of federal case law recognized in Boyle and Hudgens, the
terms and management of service contracts by the United States
military is a uniquely federal interest.198
The second unique federal interest found in Boyle is a desire
for “getting the Government’s work done.”199 While this typically
comes in the form of limiting the liability of federal officials con
ducting their duties, at its heart it is an interest in allowing the
United States to conduct all of its various functions free from the
encumbrances of excessive liability.200 The Boyle Court did not
find a meaningful distinction between an independent contractor
performing his obligations for the military and a federal official per
196. Id. at 504; see Mark D. Rosen, Was Shelley v. Kraemer Incorrectly Decided?
Some New Answers, 95 CAL. L. REV. 451, 496 n.243 (2007) (describing Supreme Court
case law on “[u]nique federal interests”).
197. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 504-05; see Wendy B. Davis, De Facto Merger, Federal
Common Law, and Erie: Constitutional Issues in Successor Liability, 2008 COLUM. BUS.
L. REV. 529, 591 (2008) (“The Court [in Boyle] found a uniquely federal interest in
limiting the liability of military contractors.”).
198. See Hudgens, 328 F.3d at 1334; see also Ben Davidson, Note, Liability on the
Battlefield: Adjudicating Tort Suits Brought by Soldiers Against Military Contractors, 37
PUB. CONT. L.J. 803, 827 (2008) (“[T]he Boyle Court’s use of the FTCA discretionary
function exception to cabin the uniquely federal interest of procuring military equip
ment could just as easily apply when the Government buys nonmilitary products or
services.”).
199. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 505; see David E. Seidelson, Federal Common Law:
Whose Baby Are You?, 5 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 365, 368-69 (1996).
200. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 505-06. The Court admitted that this interest had been
specifically stated as one concerning the liability of federal officials. Id.; see, e.g., How
ard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593, 597 (1959) (holding that an interest in overseeing the actions
of federal officials is uniquely federal in nature); see also Koen Lenaerts & Kathleen
Gutman, “Federal Common Law” in the European Union: A Comparative Perspective
from the United States, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 98-100 (2006) (explaining the Court’s
rationale in linking the Boyle facts to contractual obligations and limiting the scope of
federal official liability, issues which the private contractor scenario did not directly
represent but which it indirectly touched).
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forming his duties as they relate to getting the job done.201
Whether it is for a military procurement contract or a military ser
vices contract, both involve private contractors carrying out a con
tractual obligation to the United States military in the furtherance
of military goals.202 Under the Boyle analysis, there are unique fed
eral interests implicated by the application of state tort law to
claims arising out of injuries caused by military service contractors.
To justify preemption of state tort law, it is not enough that
there are substantial federal interests involved. There must also be
significant conflict between those interests and the application of
state law.203 It is at this stage of the analysis that the discretionaryfunction exemption comes into play.204 The discretionary-function
exemption, as part of a federal statute, is a textual expression of
federal policy.205 The policy embodied in that exemption comes
into conflict with state law when claims arise that call on courts to
assess, and potentially interfere with, discretionary decisions made
by the United States government.206 As demonstrated in Boyle, in
the products-procurement context, the statutory goal of protecting
government officials who make discretionary decisions conflicts
with the application of state law, which must therefore be
preempted.
201. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 505 (“The present case involves an independent contrac
tor performing its obligation under a procurement contract, rather than an official per
forming his duty as a federal employee, but there is obviously implicated the same
interest in getting the Government’s work done.”).
202. Id. at 506. The Court stated that “[t]he federal interest justifying this hold
ing surely exists as much in procurement contracts as in performance contracts; we see
no basis for distinction.” Id. The Court stated this in reference to Yearsley v. W.A.
Construction Co. and the established history of federal law preempting state law for
civilian government service or performance contracts. See Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Con
str. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 21 (1940). The interpretation here should thus be the same for
military service contracts, which clearly must represent a unique federal interest. See
Hudgens, 328 F.3d at 1334.
203. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507 (“That the procurement of equipment by the United
States is an area of uniquely federal interest does not, however, end the inquiry. That
merely establishes a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for the displacement of state
law.”); see Roger Doyle, Comment, Contract Torture: Will Boyle Allow Private Military
Contractors to Profit from the Abuse of Prisoners?, 19 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS.
& DEV. L.J. 467, 479 (2007) (“However, simply finding a unique federal interest does
not inevitably result in the displacement of state law. Displacement will only occur
where a significant conflict exists between an identifiable unique federal interest and
the operation of state law.” (citation omitted)).
204. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511.
205. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2006).
206. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511.
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Establishing a judicial basis for preemption of state-law tort
suits against military contractors may appear to be an abstract un
dertaking. Behind this undertaking, however, is a very real concern—the lost opportunity for citizens of the United States to be
compensated for injuries they suffer in interactions with a military
contractor. The immunity doctrine proposed by this Note would
require not only an individualized loss of compensation but also the
complete disregard of a bedrock principle of the American legal
tradition—that people are entitled to be compensated for injuries
they suffer—for an entire category of claims.207 There is, however,
an established line of Supreme Court precedent that supports deny
ing plaintiffs their day in court, especially within the context of pro
tecting military interests.
Perhaps the most notable example of the Court’s willingness to
deny relief in such circumstances is United States v. Stanley.208 Re
call that Master Sergeant James B. Stanley, a member of the United
States Army, was secretly administered LSD as part of an official
army plan to test the effects of the drug.209 Because of this testing,
Stanley suffered an extensive list of problems that ultimately ruined
his post-service life.210 If any claim deserves redress and compensa
tion, it would be a claim such as Stanley’s.211 Instead, the Court
207. See Ronen Perry, The Economic Bias in Tort Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV.
1573, 1610 (2008) (“One may argue that any attempt to challenge the principle of full
compensation for harm caused by wrongful conduct defies the basic structure of tort
law.”).
208. 483 U.S. 669 (1987).
209. Id. at 671.
210. Id. Stanley suffered from hallucinations, memory loss, and personality
changes that impaired his work performance and ultimately resulted in the end of his
marriage. Id.
211. In fact, the opinion by Justice O’Connor suggests that it must be compen
sated, raising comparisons to the medical testing by Nazi officials during the Second
World War. See id. at 709-10 (O’Connor, J., concurring and dissenting). After restating
the standard that there must be consent by the test subjects, Justice O’Connor stated,
“If this principle is violated the very least that society can do is to see the victims are
compensated, as best they can be, by the perpetrators.” Id. at 710. Justice Brennan
also delivered a sharply worded opinion: “[T]he Court disregards the commands of our
Constitution, and bows instead to the purported requirements of a different master,
military discipline, declining to provide Stanley with a remedy because it finds ‘special
factors counseling hesitation.’” Id. at 686 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting)
(quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 396 (1971)). Justice Brennan went on to state that “[t]he subject of experimenta
tion who has not volunteered is treated as an object, a sample. James Stanley will re
ceive no compensation for this indignity.” Id. at 707. The words of Justices Brennan
and O’Connor accurately frame the severity of the offense against Stanley.
The decision of the Court went against Stanley based on “military discipline,” as
Justice Brennan noted. Id. at 686. Perhaps even more frustrating to Justice Brennan
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rejected Stanley’s arguments and denied him a remedy.212 The Su
preme Court showed itself willing to reject the compensation for a
heinous, blatant, and intentional tort in order to protect the govern
ment interests under examination in this Note.
Stanley was not the first time the Court had shown such an
inclination to protect government interests over the right of individ
uals to obtain redress in court.213 Boyle also demonstrated the
Court’s willingness to see individuals go uncompensated where it
deems such an outcome necessary to protect the United States’s
control over the terms of military contracts and judgment regarding
the appropriate trade-offs between safety, efficiency, and various
other concerns.214 Cases like Boyle and Stanley show that the
Court is willing to put aside the basic principles of redress for injury
that form the core of American tort law in cases where that law
substantially conflicts with a uniquely federal interest.215 It is estab
lished that the interest in getting the government’s work done and
protecting the ability of the military to enter into and perform con
tracts is sufficient to displace state tort concerns in productsprocurement situations.216 Thus, no logical reason exists to deny a
similar outcome in situations involving military service contracts.
B. How Much Immunity Is Necessary?
Military contractors should be entitled to a standard of immu
nity, modified from the Boyle standard, in cases where the contrac
tor followed specified terms set by the United States military and
was that it could not even be shown concretely how military discipline was implicated in
the case; it was a “talismanic invocation” of the military-discipline concern. Id. at 708.
While Justice Brennan’s words are biting and persuasive, the real force of the Stanley
decision comes in the recognition of just how far the Court is willing to go to protect the
interests of the military.
212. Id. at 686 (majority opinion).
213. See Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Const. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 22 (1940) (holding that a
civilian claim could not be brought against a government contractor acting within the
bounds of its constitutional assignment by the United States government).
214. See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988). In creating its
limited immunity standard, the Court accepted that certain injuries would not be com
pensated. On remand, judgment for the defendants was ordered because United Tech
nologies satisfied the elements of the government-contractor defense. Boyle v. United
Techs. Corp., No. 85-2264, 1988 WL 96122, at *1 (4th Cir. Aug. 3, 1988) (per curiam).
Thus, the decision in Boyle explicitly paved the way for a wrongful death claim to go
uncompensated.
215. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 147 (1803) (“It is a settled
and invariable principle, that every right, when withheld, must have a remedy, and
every injury its proper redress.”).
216. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512.
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fulfilled them satisfactorily. The alternatives are not sufficient. The
Feres doctrine is inappropriate because it is too broad (shielding
from liability for any injury suffered incident to service, thus even in
cases of simple incompetent execution on the part of the contrac
tor) and too narrow (shielding only from claims by soldiers and not
from civilians, thus leaving the contractor potentially liable for mis
takes originating in government plans given to the contractor).217
The political-question doctrine, because of its inconsistent applica
tion, is also not a sufficient standard. Boyle presents the most bal
anced and fair approach because it can be applied evenly to select
out those cases that threaten the military interests the Court wishes
to protect, regardless of who is bringing the claim or what type of
claim it is.
1. The Feres Doctrine Is an Inappropriate Standard
Despite the relevance of military-discipline concerns to cases
involving military service contractors, the analytic structure of the
Feres doctrine itself is not well-suited for the type of immunity doc
trine such cases demand. There are two main reasons for this con
clusion. First, the Feres doctrine’s incident-to-service test is far too
broad.218 Any type of modified incident-to-service test would im
munize service contractors from virtually all liability.219 Such a so
217. See supra notes 169-173 and accompanying text.
218. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 510 (“[I]t seems to us that the Feres doctrine . . .
logically produces results that are . . . too broad . . . .”); McMahon v. Presidential Air
ways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1351 (11th Cir. 2007) (“We think it quite clear that the inci
dent-to-service test sweeps far too broadly to protect this concern. Some suits barred
by the incident-to-service test simply do not involve sensitive military judgments that
courts lack the competence or authority to deal with.”).
219. See R. Craig Anderson & John. M. Pellett, Personal Civil Liability for Fed
eral Employees and Their Representation by the Department of Justice in the Aftermath
of the Westfall Legislation—An Introduction for the Base Judge Advocate, 33 A.F. L.
REV. 19, 28 (1990) (“The scope of injuries incident to service and thus barred by the
Feres doctrine is broad enough to encompass virtually any injury for which a plaintiff
might seek to sue a federal official individually.” (alteration to original)); see also Rob
ert J. Gross, Special Considerations in Military Flying Club Litigation, 59 J. AIR L. &
COM. 561, 577-78 (1994) (“‘[I]ncident to service’ is not a narrow term restricted to mili
tary training, field maneuvers, or combat situations; rather it is a broad concept encom
passing all types of recreational activities, even though the military member is not
acting pursuant to orders or subject to direct military command or discipline.”).
If an incident-to-service standard were used as the main test for immunity for ser
vice contractors, it would immunize contractors from liability for their own blatant neg
ligence. Imagine, for example, that a contracted helicopter mechanic forgot to
complete a portion of a scheduled check mandated by the government by the terms of
the maintenance contract. A pilot of the United States Navy then flies the vehicle. It
crashes, and he is injured. Based on a modified incident-to-service test, the injured
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lution is not fair, nor is it justified by concerns for military discipline
or the discretionary-function exception to the FTCA.
Additionally, the Feres doctrine’s incident-to-service test is too
narrow because it would only protect contractors from suits by
soldiers.220 While many of the suits brought against military con
tractors would be brought by soldiers, the fact that civilian contrac
tors now make up more than half of the manpower on the ground
in Iraq shows the potential that exists for military contractors to be
sued by one of the tens of thousands of other contractors on the
ground with them or any other civilian.221 A test that covers only a
subset of the population that could potentially bring suit, and cov
ers that subset to an excessive degree, does not represent a reasona
ble standard.222 So, while the concern for military discipline that
pilot would have no claim against the contractor. This would not be a fair or justifiable
result since there is little or no recognizable benefit to military discipline or any preser
vation of discretionary functions if a contractor is immunized from liability for its own
negligence. The only interest served in such a case would be that of the contractor.
Such an interest does not justify displacing the basic right of compensation for those
injured by contractor’s negligence. See McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1351 (“For example,
where a private contractor agent is running a mess hall on a peacetime base, and a
soldier gets food poisoning attributable to the contractor’s negligence, the suit would be
barred under the ‘incident to service’ test.”).
220. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 510-11. “[R]eliance on Feres produces (or logically
should produce) results that are in another respect too narrow.” Id. at 510. The Court
found the Feres doctrine inapplicable for the contractor scenario because it would not
protect the government interests in cases where civilians were injured because of an
interaction with a government contractor. Id. The Court provides the following
example:
Since that doctrine covers only service-related injuries, and not injuries caused
by the military to civilians, it could not be invoked to prevent, for example, a
civilian’s suit against the manufacturer of fighter planes, based on a state tort
theory, claiming harm from what is alleged to be needlessly high levels of
noise produced by the jet engines. Yet we think that the character of the jet
engines the Government orders for its fighter planes cannot be regulated by
state tort law, no more in suits by civilians than in suits by members of the
Armed Services.
Id. at 510-11; see also McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1355 (holding that an application of Feres
to a service contractor “would be too narrow because it would only protect against suits
implicating sensitive military judgments that are brought by soldiers, and not against
those brought by civilians, or even employees of the private contractor itself”).
221. See supra note 25.
222. See McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1354. The court presented a scenario where three
individuals are injured in conjunction with some act by a military contractor. Id. One is
a soldier, one a civilian employee of the contractor, and the other is a journalist. Id. In
such a case, both the journalist and the contractor’s employee could sue while the sol
dier could not. Id. The court determined that “[t]here is simply no principled reason
why this result should obtain.” Id. In a similar example presented by the court, it
pointed out that suits brought by the employees would not be barred, “[y]et they would
present the very same threat of subjecting sensitive military judgments to second-guess
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has come to dominate Feres claims is certainly present, the incident
to-service test at the core of the Feres doctrine simply cannot be the
standard for immunity for military service contractors.
2. The Political-Question Doctrine Is Not Sufficient
Nor is the existing political-question doctrine sufficient to pro
tect the interests implicated by military service contractor liability.
The doctrine lacks the type of consistent, clear, and specific applica
tion necessary to guarantee protection of military interests.223 The
situation does not call for a prudentially applied immunity left to
the case-by-case whims of any particular judge but rather a predict
able and consistent standard where the question of immunity would
be resolved beforehand by referencing specific criteria set forth in
the test.
While the rationale of the political-question doctrine coincides
in some places with this Note’s proposed test,224 there are likely to
be many instances where the doctrine would be inapplicable yet
where a Boyle-type test would still provide a fair and necessary im
munity to a military contractor. An example would be where a mil
itary policy led to an injury and the military subsequently—but
before litigation—changed its policy.225 In such a case, there would
be no worries of confusing and differing positions espoused by the
different branches of government. Removed from the incident and
ing by a court.” Id. Thus, the results are neither fair nor effective. The military’s abil
ity to do its work without interference is not protected, and soldiers are specifically
singled out to not be allowed to recover for their injuries in situations where civilians
can. Id.
223. See Rebecca L. Brown, When Political Questions Affect Individual Rights:
The Other Nixon v. United States, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 125, 152-54 (1993) (discussing
the inconsistent application of the political-question doctrine, stating that “[t]he result is
a political-question ‘doctrine’ that is mixed up and inconsistent with its own purposes”);
Melissa Blair, Comment, Terrorism, America’s Porous Borders, and the Role of the In
vasion Clause Post-9/11/2001, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 167, 200-02 (2003) (discussing the “ju
risprudential chaos” of the Court’s application of the political-question doctrine to
claims raising questions of foreign relations). This “jurisprudential chaos” would not be
helpful in the quagmire of Iraq war litigation. A clear, specific rule is needed, not
merely a reliance on a nebulous and inconsistently applied standard.
224. See Davidson, supra note 198, at 805-06, 822-27. Davidson argues that the
Boyle test and the political-question doctrine are different versions of the same concept.
Id. Boyle represents a more specific application of the political-question doctrine; how
ever, the political-question doctrine has been used as an imprecise application of Boyle
in situations where the text of the Boyle test does not directly relate, such as military
service contractors. Id.
225. This was the case in Hudgens v. Bell Helicopters/Textron, where the military
changed its maintenance policy after the incident. See Hudgens v. Bell Helicopters/
Textron, 328 F.3d 1329, 1330-31 (11th Cir. 2003).
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after the military had already changed its policy, a court would be
less likely to apply the political-question doctrine. What would re
main, however, would be the need to protect the discretionary deci
sions of the United States and its military. Allowing litigation to
move forward in such cases would expose the contractors to liability
where they fulfilled their duties as requested by the military.
As the Court noted in Boyle, the cost of litigation for the con
tractor would be passed on to the United States in its contracts and
would influence the ability of the government to contract in the fu
ture.226 By eliminating this fear of litigation, the costs of the United
States’s military contracts would be reduced, and more contractors
may be willing to enter into business with the United States know
ing that they would be immunized from some of the unfortunate
things that happen in military theaters. Allowing the litigation to
go forward, on the other hand, would inevitably mean the costs of
litigation would be passed on to the United States. Additionally,
fear of liability for government decisions could potentially discour
age contractors from doing business with the United States military
and thus infringe on the United States’s ability to contract. Because
of these issues, the political-question doctrine is not a complete or
reliable standard. It is too nebulous to fairly and predictably grant
immunity to military contractors.
3. A Modification of Boyle Presents the Best Standard
The test used in Boyle provides the most effective and fair
standard to use for military contractors. It shields contractors from
liability in cases where the principle cause of the injury is not any
individualized negligence but instead springs from some larger deci
sion made by the United States military. A modification of this
three-part test represents the best route to an immunity standard
for service contractors.227
226. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 511-12 (1988).
227. See Hudgens, 328 F.3d at 1333. In Hudgens, the Eleventh Circuit applied a
modified version of the Boyle standard to a claim brought against a service contractor
who had been responsible for maintenance on a helicopter that crashed. Id. at 1334-38.
The court took the Boyle test prong by prong and modified the language to specifically
suit Hudgens’s contract with the United States military. Id. The court did not consider
or criticize the United States military’s decision to maintain its own standards for the
maintenance of its vehicles. Id. The court left the military’s decisions regarding how to
appropriately balance safety and efficiency to be reviewed by those with the compe
tency and authority to do so. Id. As well, DynCorp, the maintenance contractor, was
not held liable for its maintenance performance which met the standards and require
ments the United States military set on it. Id. at 1345. While Hudgens represents an
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The first prong of the test is that the contractor had a reasona
bly specific outline of its contractual duties. This flows from the
first prong of Boyle’s test, which requires that “the United States
approve[ ] reasonably precise specifications.”228 This factor guaran
tees that the military has actually been involved in the decisionmaking process by giving the contractor a reasonably precise set of
requirements and parameters for its contractual duties.229 Within
each individual type of service, the nature of these specifications
would be different. For contracted airlines, it could be military con
trol over flight plans, passenger lists, and other things that lead to
very specific parameters within which to conduct each flight.230 For
a maintenance contractor, it could be the protocols the military had
established for the frequency and thoroughness of inspection and
repair.231 For a private security contractor, it could be protocols
covering the use of force or a host of other details. While the re
quirement might not be satisfied in exactly the same way for any
two contractors, this standard is flexible enough to only provide im
munity for contractors whose duties were discretionally decided by
the United States military.
The key in any type of service contract would be that the
guidelines provided by the government “constitute[d] a comprehen
sive regime that [the contractor] was not expected to supplement
through any procedures other than those specifically set forth.”232
Each attempt to establish this immunity would thus require con
tractors to show that the course of their actions was determined by
a “comprehensive regime.”233 Contractors who were not given spe
individual example of the application of the Boyle immunity test to service contractors,
it is also a case tailored to a set of facts. The modifications made to the Boyle test serve
to test maintenance contractors and DynCorp specifically. What is necessary is a uni
versal test, inspired by Boyle, for service contractors. This requires broader language
that is applicable to a host of types of contractors. This type of test would preserve the
same interests as Boyle and offer the same type of limited and fair protection to con
tractors, just for a different type of contract.
228. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512.
229. Id. (stating that the factor “assure[s] that the suit is within the area where the
policy of the ‘discretionary function’ would be frustrated—i.e., they assure that the de
sign feature in question was considered by a Government officer, and not merely by the
contractor itself”).
230. See McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1336 (11th Cir.
2007) (detailing the statement of work for an airline contractor).
231. See Hudgens, 328 F.3d at 1335. In Hudgens, the Army’s maintenance guide
lines controlled DynCorp’s actions and the court ruled that those guidelines constituted
something equivalent to Boyle’s reasonably specific design requirement. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
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cific parameters for their actions and who were given broader dis
cretion in determining how their duties would be carried out would
not be protected in this immunity standard. Without the existence
of specified protocols mandated by the military, there are no perti
nent discretionary decisions made by the government which the
court must protect.234 An example of this came in the application
of Boyle in Chapman, where the court did not find evidence of any
precise specifications and thus found the Boyle test inapplicable.235
The second prong of the test requires that the contractor com
pleted its duties according to the standard required by the specific
governmental regime or protocol. This prong comes from the
Boyle test’s requirement that the final product met government
specifications.236 This requirement is necessary to definitively con
nect the injury at issue to a discretionary decision made by the mili
tary and would preclude immunity in situations in which the
contractor either did not complete its duties or did so negligently.237
Contractors who negligently perform their obligations should not
be protected from liability simply because they have a contract with
the government. Furthermore, because the military’s discretionary
decision would be too far removed from claims involving contractor
negligence, such claims would not be covered by the policy ratio
234. It is possible that in some of these cases, considering a claim against a con
tractor that was left to its own devices by the military in the nebulous and oftentimes
uncharted territory of postwar occupation—all while being compensated by piles of
taxpayer dollars—would embarrass the military and perhaps interfere with it accom
plishing its goals. These situations would not fit within a Boyle-like standard of immu
nity for military service contractors and are not argued for in this Note. The politicalquestion doctrine and the state-secrets privilege exist outside of any immunity standard
for service contractors and can be invoked when warranted in such cases to protect
their own concerned interests. See Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1973) (noting
political-question doctrine); United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953) (noting
state-secrets privilege). The immunity standard argued for in this Note explicitly con
siders only those whose duties were specified to a reasonable degree by the United
States and who followed through satisfactorily on those requirements, even if they later
proved insufficient or damaging. A defining rule—such as the one presented in this
Note—which clearly separates those contractors entitled to immunity from those not
entitled to immunity could perhaps go a long way towards clearing up the legal
minefield and tasking contractors with mindfulness of their own negligence.
235. Chapman v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 911 F.2d 267, 271 (9th Cir. 1990).
Without the precise specifications of the government, there is really no discretionary
function being protected. If immunity were afforded in such a situation, the negligence
of the contractor would be shielded, not the decisions of the United States. This would
not produce fair or logical results.
236. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988).
237. Id. at 512-13. The Court also attributed the second element of the test to
limiting the test to claims that would raise the discretionary-decision issue. Id.
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nales underlying the discretionary-function exemption.238 In at
tempting to establish the immunity, the contractor would have to
show that its performance complied with its government
instructions.239
The third prong of the test requires that the contractor disclose
to the United States any knowledge of risks or dangers that it knew
of within the government’s plans. This flows directly from the final
part of the Boyle test, which requires that “the supplier warned the
United States about the dangers in the use of the equipment that
were known to the supplier but not the United States.”240 The third
factor, as in Boyle, is necessary to prevent contractors from protect
ing themselves merely by not disclosing their own awareness of
risks.241
A great strength of this test is that it is not limited to a certain
type of claim and it is not limited by who brings the suit. Regard
less of whether the claim is brought under common law, under the
FTCA, or the Constitution, the analysis of the Boyle test remains
the same. Just as well, this test is not limited to only suits brought
by soldiers—as a Feres-based test would be—nor is it limited to
claims brought by civilians. The Boyle test can be applied to any
type of claim by any type of plaintiff brought against a military
contractor.
238. Id. The Court stated that the purpose of the factor is to select down to the
claims that will involve discretionary decisions made by the military. Id. Again, there
are potential situations within this context where ancillary or tangential information
brought about by the claim could threaten state and military interests. Id. However,
here, as well, those situations are not pertinent, and the political-question doctrine and
the state-secrets privilege exist to solve those problems.
239. In Hudgens, this was achieved through evidence admitted to show that the
mechanics would not have seen the defect in the helicopter while performing their
scheduled maintenance and thus that they performed their duties satisfactorily.
Hudgens v. Bell Helicopters/Textron, 328 F.3d 1329, 1344-45 (11th Cir. 2003).
240. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512.
241. Id. at 512-13. The Court stated this position:
The third condition is necessary because, in its absence, the displacement of
state tort law would create some incentive for the manufacturer to withhold
knowledge of risks, since conveying that knowledge might disrupt the contract
but withholding it would produce no liability. We adopt this provision lest our
effort to protect discretionary functions perversely impede them by cutting off
information highly relevant to the discretionary decision.
Id. This rationale is clear and logical and the requirement is itself necessary to accom
plish the true goal of the immunity standard: to protect the ability of the military to
make informed discretionary decisions without the risk of interference from litigation.
Id.
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The test proposed by this Note provides a limiting standard
that fairly immunizes contractors only from claims in which an in
jury arose because of a discretionary decision by the United States
military in how specifically to use a contractor in conducting its mis
sion. By precluding litigation of these claims, the military’s deci
sion-making process is protected, and courts refrain from stepping
in to consider questions they are not competent to address. This
immunity standard joins other means—including the political-ques
tion doctrine and the state-secrets privilege—to shield sensitive mil
itary decisions from judicial interference.
CONCLUSION
While the Boyle standard exists for products-procurement con
tracts, the legal world remains in the dark on the liability situation
of the tens of thousands of private-service contractors on the
ground in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. What is needed is a
predictable test and standard for immunity that will protect state
interests and fairly shield contractors from liability when they have
satisfactorily completed their contractual duties. This test implicitly
recognizes that the military must be left to its own discretion and
must be able to decide for itself where the appropriate balance lies
among safety, effectiveness, cost, and efficiency. This is a different
standard than the standard for state tort law and is not one judges
are competent to adjudicate. In the case of this conflict between a
textually powered reservation of sovereign immunity242 and the tra
dition of mandating a remedy for a wrong, the remedy must be set
aside for the protection of federal interests.
An extension of Boyle into the services sphere satisfies all of
these necessities. As seen in Hudgens,243 this use of a modified
government-products, contractor-immunity standard protects the
military decision-making process and empowers the United States
to contract for military services while fairly and justly immunizing a
contractor from suit under the appropriate circumstances. This sys
tem correctly precludes recovery when the injury at the heart of the
suit was caused by decisions of the United States. For more than
two decades such a system has existed for products-procurement
contractors, while service contractors and the courts resolving the
claims against them have been left in uncharted waters. The chang
ing United States military requires the solidification of law in this
242.
243.

28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2006).
Hudgens, 328 F.3d at 1333-38.
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area. The best and clearest solution is this Note’s proposed modifi
cation of the Boyle test.
Thomas Gray*

* Thanks are due to Merritt Schnipper and Professor Bruce Miller for their
assistance.

